

New Wine in Old Bottles: Ideological Transformation
and the Rhetorical Creation of the Market in China's
People's Daily

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History is the process whereby the spirit discovers itself and its own concept.

— Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Spirit*

Abstract

China's embrace of a market economy under the leadership of a communist party was one of the most surprising ideological transformations of the 20th Century. To reveal how the Party struggled to reconcile its internal ideological conflicts, we applied computational content analysis to the full text of more than 50 years of articles published in the official newspaper of the Communist Party of China, the *People's Daily*. Some remarkable internal patterns were discovered. During the course of China's economic reform, the Party's official state rhetoric progressed path-dependently at a highly consistent pace. The development and survival of new discourses crucially depended on the utilization of old repertoires. New words were always more likely to appear first in unusual contexts. However, without being absorbed internally, external political shocks could quickly die out in the system. In contrast, one mechanism of change always held; i.e., new elements were likely to survive only in existing stable contexts. Our results suggest that in cultural production, although novelty usually comes out of unusual combinations, adaptation in stable configurations (i.e., embedding new concepts in old ideas) is a key step in long-term cumulative change. In this light, market creation during China's economic reform can be seen as a product of a carefully balanced ideological project.

In 1978, when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) decided to initiate economic reforms across China, very few people could have imagined that communist China would one day become one of the world's largest engines of capital accumulation. After waves of political and cultural revolutions, the dominant ideology of China, defined by the CCP, went down a radically different path during the last two decades of the 20th Century. A party that

once strove to adhere strictly to Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy gradually started to adopt and advocate economic policies that were very foreign to what it once believed. Throughout this period of reform, Soviet-style state planning was gradually discarded, state-owned properties were privatized on a massive scale, and the concept of a market economy was eventually enshrined in the Party's official ideology (Shirk 1993; Brandt and Rawski 2008). These reforms were followed by phenomenal economic growth and political stability among the CCP's ruling elites, which gave rise to China's appearance as a global superpower.

Most of the important work on the Chinese reform has focused on non-ideological dimensions of the reform. The trajectory of the reform can be explained in terms of changes of political power balance in CCP elite politics. The weak bureaucracy of the Chinese state after the Cultural Revolution gave Deng Xiaoping opportunities to maneuver pragmatic reforms (Shirk 1993; Vogel 2011). The decentralized political structure also gave space for regional experimentation (Qian and Weingast 1996, 1997; Oi 1999). Some scholars argue that once some market mechanisms are in place, the market would have an inertia to self-perpetuate and erode old institutions (Nee 1989; Nee and Matthews 1996). Broadly speaking, there is a common line of research that is in alignment with "the End of Ideology" thesis: market transition makes Communism and its ideology increasingly irrelevant. Since the end of the Cold War, the world has experienced a clear break from the past, and China has been integrated into a new global order (Fukuyama 1992).

Yet, how exactly could have a political party, with essentially the same body of people, changed its tone and started to advocate for ideas that are in conflict with what they believed in the past? How could a new rhetorical regime supersede an old one? Is there any internal logic to be found in its change of tone?

If Communism and its ideology had indeed become increasingly irrelevant, then despite the radicalness of the rhetorical change, the change could have only been epiphenomenal. The party would have advocated for whatever beliefs that are consistent with its pragmatic interest, and there would be little internal logic to be found in its discourse change. However,

any expert who is experienced with contemporary Chinese political discourses knows that the CCP has never loosened its hold on its communist legacy (Holbig 2013). Recent revival of Maoist tendencies in Chinese politics also suggests that Communist ideology is still pretty much relevant in today's Chinese politics and is perhaps never away (Yang 2014; Zhao 2016; Brown and Bērziņa-Čerenkova 2018; Klimeš and Marinelli 2018).

A minority group of scholars insist that there is an internalist story to be told about the Chinese reform (Tsou 1977, 1983; Sun 1995; Kluver 1996; Chang 1998). They argue that the rhetorical transformation could have only unfolded step-by-step, and each step depended crucially on the conclusion of the last step. Without the gradual change in the definition of what socialism means, the market would have never become a legitimized concept. However, as human readers have a natural tendency to rationalize what they see, it is hard to say whether any internalist interpretation is a product of confirmation bias. Ideological and moral justifications could have mostly played a role in post-hoc sensemaking (Swidler 2001; see also Vaisey 2009).

More broadly speaking, the question at hand is whether ideology and culture have any independent explanatory power regarding social processes (Kaufman 2004). In sociology, this theoretical controversy has been best known in the debates about the cause of the Protestant Reformation. Max Weber famously argues that there exists “elective affinity” between ideas, and culture can be viewed as a semi-autonomous social sphere (Weber 1930, 1958). However, as the Weberian *verstehen* approach has gradually lost its methodological appeal, in the sociology of culture, contemporary studies have mostly adopted a social structuralist explanation of beliefs and attitudes. Even in cases where ideological and moral beliefs are not directly related to material interest, there is a commonly shared assumption that explanations do not lie in any intrinsic properties of ideas, and the associations of ideas can be best explained in terms of some extrinsic and coincidental properties such as the institutional environment (Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1983; DiMaggio 1997), the social status of their believers (Lamont 1992; Bourdieu 1993), or network homophily (DellaPosta,

Shi, and Macy 2015). Some cultural sociologists insist that “cultural autonomy” exists but have been struggling with empirical validation (Alexander and Smith 2001). Establishing endogenous cultural associations with causal precision can be inherently a challenging task. Some internalist explanations rely on simulations that depend on the choice of modeling parameters (Goldberg and Stein 2018; Goldberg 2021). Some survey studies hinge on the possibility of internalist explanations of beliefs (Vaisey 2009; DiMaggio and Goldberg 2018; Amengual and Bartley 2022). However, survey responses usually lack details and resolutions and are not always best suited for generating insights about the inner logics of ideas.

Among internalist explanations of beliefs and ideas, one particular methodological and theoretical construct that has been proved very useful is the concept of a “discursive field.” The discursive field can be thought of as a system of “possible ideas,” that does not only delimit what ideas exist in a discursive space but also what range of ideas could have possibly been uttered or even entertained in a community (Foucault 1972; Wuthnow 1989; Spillman 1995; Snow 2004). In sociological analysis, it is especially useful for delineating the language space in which social changes are situated in (Wuthnow 1989; Bail 2012). And it adds a structural perspective to the theories of “issue framing” in showing how the framing of an issue can be more or less successful depending on the structure of meaning in which ideas are embedded in (Steinberg 1999; Snow 2004; Fiss and Hirsch 2005; King 2007). With the help of commonly used dimension-reduction techniques, studies show that ideas usually do not span across all possible linguistic spaces but exhibit in clusters in a discursive field (Mohr 1998; Mohr and Neely 2009; Nelson 2021a). The emergence of large quantities of digitized texts and development of unsupervised word-embedding models have also made mapping more easily possible (Bail 2014; Nelson 2021b).

However, a precise operationalization of the concept is still lacking, and the concept mostly remains an abstract theoretical term. One major source of ambiguity is that the “field” and the “space” are oftentimes indistinguishably used in the literature although they should be two separable concepts (Martin 2003; Martin, Slez, and Borckenhagen 2016). The

field is inherently a processual construct dictating how elements are prohibited, generated, or moved in a space. It is inherently at odds with static approaches in representing elements of a space. Spatial clustering is only the result of some “field effect.” It provides evidences that a field might exist but does not directly prove its existence. Without successfully distinguishing the “field” from the “space” and clarifying what a field effect is (i.e. how a field moves, impedes, and generate items in a space), discussions about the “field” remains largely speculative. And the internal logic of a system is still behind a curtain and remains elusive.

In this essay, we propose a dynamic framework to empirically validate the existence of a field and measure its effect in the rhetorical space of the Chinese Communist Party during its ideological transformation. We applied computational content analysis to more than 50 years of full-text articles published in the *People’s Daily*, the official newspaper of the CCP. With the help of neural-probabilistic models, we constructed and aligned the word-embedding spaces of the words in the newspaper.

Our exploratory analyses reveal, first, that during the course of China’s economic transformation, the Party’s official state rhetoric evolved path-dependently at a remarkably consistent pace. Second, the development of new discourse and the survival of new lexicons crucially depended on the utilization of old repertoires. After the Cultural Revolution, the reform discourse first began by reverting back to an earlier base and developed gradually from that base. Later, controversial concepts, like “market economy”, became stabilized only by being contextually attached to an existing stable rhetorical neighborhood. The aligned vector spaces allow us to not only measure how stable each concept is in the space but also how stable the contextual space is at its different locations. It allows us to tell how the rhetorical system is moving and capture the presence of a field.

Then, following our manifesto that “a field only manifests itself in its effects,” we show that the field is not only a useful analytical tool for describing what happened in the rhetorical space but also has a robust causal effect in determining which new concepts thrive and survive

in the contextual space. Throughout the entire history of the *People's Daily*, field stability exerted a strong influence on the use of all words. Although new words were always more likely to appear in unstable fields, unless they were absorbed internally, external political shocks would quickly die out in this system. Only in existing stable fields, did new elements tend to survive. The effect demonstrates the existence of this field in which some ideas, but not others, are possibly spoken. Therefore, we argue that regardless of political turmoil, the Party's official language possessed an autonomy of its own.

We will start this essay by reviewing the history of the Chinese rhetorical transformation. Next, we will locate the root of our problem in relevant discussions in the sociology of culture. Then, we will discuss how introducing the concept of a discursive field could help address the problem. And we will propose our way of proving the existence of a field and measuring field effects and show our evidences.

China's Great Transformation in Retrospect

Marketization is a social process that institutionalizes the free flow of capital. As explained in Karl Polanyi's famous argument, the "free market" was realized in Western Europe precisely because of deliberate advocacy made by laissez-faire politicians and thinkers of the removal of any societal constraints on it (Polanyi 2001). Ideology is one type of such constraints that exists in people's minds. It can be broadly defined as a system of beliefs (Converse 1964, 3), or more fundamentally symbols (Geertz 1973), in which its elements are bound together to some degree and interacting with each other. It involves moral beliefs that regulate what should and shouldn't be done in society. Recent development in economic sociology points in the direction that the market does not only interact with morality, but as a performative concept, it is itself a moral object (Fourcade and Healy 2007). It demarcates what is exchangeable in society (Zelizer 1979, 1994) and is constituted of institutions, tools, and calculative devices with built-in prescriptive theories (Callon 1998; Callon and Muniesa

2005; MacKenzie 2006). In communist China, it has always been a contested moral and political concept.

In orthodox Marxism, the “free market” has no place in a socialist economy.¹ However, if someone opens an ideopolitics (*sixiang zhengzhi*) textbook used in Chinese high schools today and finds relevant passages on the “socialist market economy,” it would read something this: “China is still in an early stage of socialism, in which public ownership dominates but also co-exists with other types of ownership. Advancing the productive force is still a main task for Chinese society today. Market economy is a mechanism that regulates the distribution of resources to meet supply and demand relationships according to the Law of Value and is not exclusive to capitalism. It is an economic instrument that is suited for China’s current level of productive force.”²

To make Marxism and the market economy compatible, certain premises are clearly needed (Chang 1998). The reconciliation relies upon an interpretation of Marx’s historical materialism that puts a heavy emphasis on the determining role of productive force in the development of history. It requires the postulate that socialism has different stages, and there can exist some level of inequality and private ownership in some stages. It also needs to downplay some other Marxism principles, such as class struggle and anti-exploitation, both of which play pivotal roles in CCP’s earlier revolutionary doctrines (66-84). How could have the CCP made the transition?

In order to fully appraise the importance of the question, some historical background is needed. The transformation of China in the late-20th century was a story of the transformation of the Communist Party. The CCP is an elitist party that was built upon the ideology of Marxism and Leninism. The Party is ideological and elitist by design. According

1. In *Anti-Dühring*, for instance, Engels (1894) argues that the “anarchist” market is the site of commodity exchange where the separation of means of production from their producers takes place and results in the antagonism between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. This process of appropriation eventually leads to the proletariat revolution after which the anarchist market “is replaced by conscious organisation on a planned basis” (318). See also Chang (1998, 51–53) on Mao’s insistence on social planning.

2. The argument can be found, for instance, in Special Topic 5, Section 2 (pp. 83-86) of *Sixiang Zhengzhi Xuanxiu 2: Jingjixue Changshi* (Ideopolitics Elective 2: Basic Concepts of Economics) published by *Renmin Jiaoyu Chubanshe*. See also Ouyang (2001, 94–96) for an elaborate walk-through of the argument.

to Lenin (1929), the working class does not possess class-consciousness on their own, and therefore the Communist Party should act as the revolutionary vanguard for the mass and lead the working class to the final victory of socialism. Within CCP party elites, ideological struggles about what path is the right “socialist” path to take are always a central theme (Tsou 1977). Mao Zedong famously argued that “class struggle should be emphasized every year, every month, and every day.”³ During the Cultural Revolution, Mao sacked Deng Xiaoping three times because Mao was suspicious of Deng’s pragmatist policy-approaches as “capitalist-leaning” (Vogel 2011, 49–174; Tsou 1977). After Mao’s death in 1976, Deng was able to take control of the party and initiate economic reform. However, Mao’s legacy, as solidified in the so-called Mao Zedong Thought remained a central pillar in the Party’s official doctrinaire while many party senior leaders such as Chen Yun still supported some adjusted versions of planned economy (Sun 1995). The reform was carried through a dual-track system with market-oriented mechanisms gradually replacing state planning (Shirk 1993; Naughton 1995). Its direction was not clearly laid out at the beginning and only became clearer after many rounds of in-party theoretical debates about the “essence of socialism” (Sun 1995).

The CCP’s embrace of the market is apparently a huge reversal in its official doctrinaire. However, existing studies of China’s political economy have predominantly treated the rhetorical transformation as a consequence rather than a cause and focused mostly on non-ideological factors. Some scholars regard socialism in Post-Mao China only as an empty “disguise” of pragmatism (Cohen 1988; Pye 1986). Scholars holding the Market Transition Theory argue that the market unleashed itself through generating social institutions that eroded the old distributive system (Nee 1989). During market transition, producers in the private sector gain a larger share of return relative to redistributors in state planning sectors, which will give the private sector incentives to continue to grow. The end result is a shift of resources and privileges from the public sector to the private sector. Therefore, the market has a force to self-perpetuate. On the other hand, scholars studying elite politics

3. Mao first made the statement in his speech given at the Tenth Plenum Of The Eighth CCP Central Committee held in Sep, 1962.

point out the lack of a strong state bureaucracy, an unintended consequence of the Cultural Revolution, as an enabler of change (Shirk 1993). The lack of centralization created an M-form of organizational structure. Fiscal decentralization and promotional incentives induced local governments to act as *de facto* enterprises in an industrial competition (Walder 1995; Oi 1999; Zhou 2007; Qian and Weingast 1996, 1997). Some account also suggests that some earlier deviations from the planned economy started with local experimentation from below rather than directives from the top (Liu 1992). Ideology is at best absent, if not irrelevant, in these accounts. The legitimation of market concepts like “private ownership” and “property rights” is only a natural consequence of the institutional changes on the ground.

An implicit assumption behind many of these accounts is that party leaders can conveniently alter or abandon party discourses at will, and therefore ideology has no independent explanatory power. However, through careful historical analyses, some scholars have shown that the assumption is simply untrue (Tsou 1977, 1983; Sun 1995; Kluver 1996). In the formative stages of the Chinese economic reform, factional lines among the Party’s top leaders were always drawn upon ideological lines, and policy debates were often justified in ideological principles (Tsou 1977; Sun 1995). Discourse changes were not post-facto justifications of policies already in place but results of vigorous debates. The rhetorical transformation took place through stages that depended on the conclusions of the previous stages.

For instance, the first major intra-party political struggle in the post-Mao era took place in the shape of an epistemological debate on the criterion of truth. After Mao died, Hua Guofeng, Mao’s appointed heir, officially ended the Cultural Revolution but also proposed “Two Whatevers”⁴ to consolidate his power base and maintain the status quo. To counter Hua’s move, Deng Xiaoping and his allies (most notably, Hu Yaobang) endorsed and circulated a philosophical article named “Practice is the Sole Criterion of Truth.”⁵ Referencing

4. Hua made the statement that “we will resolutely uphold whatever policy decisions Chairman Mao made, and unswervingly follow whatever instructions Chairman Mao gave.” The statement was printed in a joint editorial named “Study the Documents Well and Grasp the Key Link,” in the *People’s Daily* on Feb 27, 1977.

5. The article was independently submitted by Hu Fuming, a philosophy professor at Nanjing University. It was first published in an internal party publication and was then reprinted on numerous party publication

extensively from the writings of Marx, Lenin, and Mao, the article advocated for using social practice as a fundamental and independent ground for judging and reevaluating communist theories. Despite the fact that Hua and his allies strongly opposed the article, the article triggered nationwide debates among party elites, which eventually turned into criticisms against “whateverism.” Through this debate, Deng was able to garner enough support to form a large coalition and declared a decisive ideological victory in the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Party Congress held in 1978 (Vogel 2011, 227–47). The meeting and its conclusion marked the beginning of China’s economic reform. Political calculations very likely played pivotal roles in the forming of the winning coalition, but the format of the political struggle was by any means ideological. (See Sun (1995, 22–34) for a full review of the debate.) The settlement of the debate also had immediate applications. The truth criterion allowed for a systematic reassessment of extreme Maoism. Through a subsequent debate, the party was able to drop “class struggle” out of the “principle contradiction of Chinese society” in the next year.

In the economic domain, one of the earliest controversial issues was how to deal with collective farming as exemplified in the communes. Although some villages in Anhui Province had already started delegating production responsibility back to households, the Party didn’t change its official policy until 1981. In the early years, even reformers still saw household responsibility as a violation of the socialist economy (61). However, the earlier settlement on the Truth Debate gave space for local reformers to test what economic practices best meet China’s “objective condition.” Anhui’s experiment proved successful in alleviating poverty, and eventually, the Party changed its official line and started to promote household responsibility nationwide.

Reforms in urban economics took a much longer journey because they dealt with the core of socialist planning. During much of the 1980s, the party line was divided between a conservative faction led by veteran leaders surrounding Chen Yun, who wanted to only make

including the *Guangming Daily* and *Peopole’s Daily* (Vogel 2011, 211).

adjustments to the planning system, and a radical reformist faction led by General Party Secretary Hu Yaobang and Premier Zhao Ziyang, who were in favor of pushing forward full-scale economic and even political reforms. Chen Yun's economic model dominated the reform agenda in the early years. In his model, the market plays a supplementary role in a national economy dominated by planning (Sun 1995, 64; Shirk 1993, 224). On the other hand, the reformers, who belonged to a younger generation and were the actual carriers of most of the day-to-day operations, were constantly trying to relax the old dogmas and bring in new elements. At a time when a socialist "market economy" was still inconceivable, they pushed forward the legitimization of concepts such as "individual economy," "self-interest," "profit," and "enterprise autonomy" and advocated for a "commodity economy (with plans)" (*you jihua de shangpin jingji*) (Sun 1995, 63–82).⁶ A recurring theme is reformers making the argument that the communal economy envisioned in Marx's writing is for society at a very advanced stage, and advancing the productive force of Chinese society according to the Law of Value should be the primary concern for Chinese socialism. But whenever the reformers made a big step forward, the conservatives always launched a counter-movement in response, most notably the campaigns against "spiritual corruption" in 1984 (Shirk 1993, 224–25) and against "bourgeois liberalization" in 1986, the later of which eventually led to the dismissal of Hu Yaobang. Deng Xiaoping acted as the ultimate arbitrator in the middle, siding with the reformers when prioritizing economic growth and with the conservatives when prioritizing political stability. The reform took a zigzag process but was nevertheless accumulative. New concepts were not all equally legitimizable,⁷ and most of the political agendas never became materialized. The conservative faction declared a landslide victory and almost completely marginalized the reformist faction after suppressing the 1989 Tiananmen Student Democracy Movement. However, unsatisfied with the economic slowdown which came afterward, Deng

6. Zhao Ziyang coined the term first in 1984 and included "with plans" in the phrase in order to appease the conservatives.

7. One failed example is the case of "joint stock ownership." Reformist economists first proposed the idea in 1986. However, the authority quickly put the discussion off the table after its first launch because of its implication for privatization. The concept was only brought to the table again after the 1992 market reform and did not become fully legitimized until the 15th Party Congress in 1997.

intervened in 1992 and reactivated China's "market reform." It was under the invention of Deng's appointed heir, Jiang Zemin (who was siding with the conservatives before 1992), that the "socialist market economy" (*shehuizhuyi shichang jingji*) became fully legitimized. However, Jiang didn't have a difficult time finding the right vocabulary and framing strategy this time as most of the preceding concepts and theories were already in place thanks to the reformists' efforts in the 1980s.

Scholars who paid attention to this history convincingly demonstrated the importance of many ideological debates. They show that many of the debates can only be understood in terms of vocabularies within the communist ideology, and the framing of those arguments matters. However, it is nevertheless difficult to exactly pinpoint the role ideology played in this history. Undoubtedly, many influences at important historical junctures were historically contingent. For instance, without Deng's intervention in 1992, the reform could have taken a very different path, and the explanation probably lies more in Deng's personal vision. For internalists, it is hard to argue against their skeptics who raise the possibility that ideological debates are the mere appearances of non-ideological struggles. It is also hard to entertain what the counterfactuals are. Had the reformist philosophers been less skillful in citing and reinterpreting Marx and Mao in justifying their positions, could the Truth Debate have landed any differently? Given that there were also elaborately argued philosophical attempts that failed miserably during the same period, does ideological framing really matter?⁸ If framing matters, what are the necessary conditions for a successful framing strategy? Are there any internal and structural constraints that enable or disable ideological change? Without answering these questions, it is hard to argue for a strong internalist explanation.

The problem corresponds to a century-long problem in the sociology of culture, which is best known in the debate surrounding the causal role of the Protestant Reformation. In many

8. One failed example is the "humanist" (*rendaozhuyi*) movement advocated by Zhou Yang, a former vice minister of the Central Propaganda Department, and Wang Ruoshui, one of the deputy editors-in-chief of the *People's Daily*. Based on Marx's early writings on alienation, they argued for Marxism as a humanism but faced strong reactions from the conservatives in the Anti-Spiritual Corruption campaign. The campaign resulted in the dismissal of the President of the *People's Daily*, and Wang Ruoshui was eventually expelled from the party.

respects, China's redefinition of socialism is comparable to the Reformation of the 16th century. Both movements were a departure from a society in which a set of ideological principles provided guidance for every aspect of its social and economic life. Both had an institutionalized clergy that adopted a highly confined vocabulary. From their own vocabularies, the reformers were nevertheless able to develop some new discourses that fundamentally changed what was considered good vs. bad in their existing value systems and reoriented people's social and economic life. However, regardless of their significance in the history of ideas, what causal roles they played in the development of history is an open question. In the next section, we will go back to the theoretical debate in sociology and try to track the root of the problem.

Protestant Reformation Revisited

From a Marxist perspective, an ideological change takes the form of a disillusion and has no significance of its own. The historical development of a society is determined by the material relations in its economic base. The ruling class imposes its ideology as the ideal of universal mankind. Ideology is a "false consciousness" that mystifies the dominant relationships of production. Any change in ideology only reflects a change in the ruling class. As Marx (1974) states in *The German Ideology*, "morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness no longer retain the semblance of independence; they have no history and no development."

Since the founding of sociology, sociologists have always been deeply concerned about whether there is anything beyond the materialist thesis, and the Reformation has been repeatedly used as a case to generate and test theories of social and ideological change. In *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, Max Weber (1930) famously argues that historically there existed a causal relationship between the Calvinist idea of "predestination" and the early development of Capitalism. According to Weber's thesis, Calvinist believers

developed a work ethic of wealth accumulation due to their desires to demonstrate that they were elected by God. Calvinism was conducive to the early development of Capitalism because there was an “elective affinity” among those ideas.

The historical accuracy of Weber’s account remains to be a subject of debate. Weber might have cherry-picked some of his evidences (Walzer 1966). Given that Capitalism was also developed in other parts of the world where the Protestant Ethic was absent, it remains doubtful whether the role of the Protestant Ethic was truly decisive in the development of Capitalism (Swidler 1986). However, on top of this first causal layer, Weber also poses another type of causal question, which is concerned about the inherent connectedness of ideas in ideological transformation. This second vision is more clearly articulated in his piece “Religious Rejections of the World and Their Directions” (Weber 1958). It has less to do with whether the Protestant ideology caused any economic change. The question is whether ideology would change in predictable directions when it is in conflict with other spheres of activities. Weber sees the Protestant Reformation as a solution for reconciling the conflict between the universal brotherliness of religion and the this-worldliness of economic calculation. Weber argues that although humans are not necessarily uncomfortable with holding inconsistent beliefs, the establishment of priesthood and separation of social activities would nevertheless put each social sphere at a tendency of rationalizing itself. When one social sphere is in conflict with another social sphere, the problem demands a solution. Because rationalization imposes constraints, there is only a limited number of directions in which change could take place. Weber argues in precision that Puritan asceticism was one of the only two ways for escaping the tension, and therefore the ideological change was predictable and followed an “inner law” of its own.

Ann Swidler (1986) challenges the idea that culture guides people’s actions in predetermined directions and questions Weber’s ability in explaining why the Protestant Reformation proceeded in the ascetic direction rather than other possible directions. Swidler also cites the study of Michael Walzer (1966), which puts the emergence of Calvinism into its historical

context. She points out that Calvin was not just a revolutionary priest but also the ruler of the small theocracy of Geneva. His doctrines served his need of maintaining organized control of his disciple citizens. Swidler proposes an alternative theory of seeing culture as toolkits for people to organize their actions to meet their situational needs. Although Swidler generally dismisses the internal coherence of culture, in the same article, Swidler also makes a distinction between “settled lives” and “unsettled lives,” and she at least suggests that during unsettled periods when great social transformations are ongoing, different ideologies emerge in competition with each other and articulate in more consistent fashions.

A closer read of Walzer (1966)’s book *The Revolution of the Saints* nevertheless suggests that there was more beyond a structural need. Walzer dismisses the Weberian argument that there was a historical link between the Calvinist theology and the idea of capital accumulation as there was very little historical evidence suggesting that religious reformers at the time were preoccupied with economic thinking. However, the Calvinist saints were also not just radicalized revolutionaries. They belonged to a rising social class who had an existential need to secure a spiritual safe harbor in a world of disorder. The need was not just materialistically structural but also psychologically structural. Through the re-discovery of “predestination” in the lines of the Bible, they found a way of orienting their spiritual life in a transformed world. In this sense, “the saints discovered in themselves a predestination.” Walzer’s account suggests that the coherence of Calvinism was not a byproduct; rather this ideological movement had an inner core of its own.

Robert Wuthnow (1989) theorizes the tension between the material and psychological as a problem of articulation. He reasons that in order to make an ideology achieve a long-lasting influence, a reformer needs to both articulate his ideological vision well to serve certain social structural needs and also transcend from the historical specifics to make the ideas universal. In *Communities of Discourse*, Wuthnow gives a detailed analysis of the social context in which the Reformation arose. In short, Europe’s commercial expansion over the sea gave the rise of a new type of political entity, the cities. The reformation was a coalition between the

city princes and the religious reformers against the Catholic moral order of the landlords. Martin Luther's doctrine of individualism served the need for breaking religious believers' attachment to the landed nobility. However, the social-structuralist account was supposedly only half of the story. As the religious reformers started to enjoy stable access to resources, they also enjoyed an autonomy of their own. They provided guidance for specific actions only in accordance with a general symbolic framework defined by a set of basic binaries such as "good vs. evil," "temporal vs. spiritual," and "man vs. God." Wuthnow calls such a framework a "discursive field" and points out that Luther and Calvin each had a distinctive field that was guided by its internal structure. As the movement unfolded, the fields started to acquire some independence from the social environment. However, Wuthnow's book provides much fewer empirical details and evidence about the field story than the social-structuralist story.

The literature on the Protestant Reformation suggests that there are two important questions that can be asked about the role of ideology in social transformation. The first one is concerned with the causal link between the ideational and the social structural. The second one is about the internal dynamics of ideas. The question is whether ideological change can be explained and predicted from within. Neither question is settled. But as exemplified in studies of the Protestant Reformation, accounts given to the second question are oftentimes much harder to articulate. In this essay, we are primarily concerned about the second question.

Internalist Explanations of Culture

Among cultural sociologists, although there exist a wide range of theories with regard to how culture interacts with the materialist world, it is, in general, less controversial to admit that there are at least some internal structures in cultural systems. For instance, in "Culture in Action," although the main argument is that culture, rather than providing end-values, is "used" as "toolkits" in people's everyday life, Swidler is very careful in distinguishing her

theory from a reductionist account and puts a special emphasis on how culture as repertoires can be constraining. The controversial matter is to what extent do internal structures exist and matter in social change. In Swidler (2001)'s words, the problem of "whether and how some cultural elements control, anchor, or organize others" remains "the biggest unanswered question in the sociology of culture."

Rooted in the works of Weber (1958) and Durkheim (2001), sociology has a tradition of explaining how cultural systems operate from within. However, as the discipline becomes further established as an empirical science grounded in objective rigor, it also faces strong methodological and theoretical resistance towards treating meaning too seriously (Geertz 1973, 195). For instance, although social contexts and discursive fields allegedly play equal weight in Wuthnow (1989)'s theory of the Protestant Reformation, Wuthnow devoted far more work to the former rather than the latter. One reason is perhaps that the former is more easily empirically verifiable than the latter. In his methodological note, Wuthnow criticized classical theories for treating culture and ideology too vaguely as wholistic world-views (or "free-floating *Zeitgeist*") that have no "empirical referents" and dismissed Weberian psychological explanations as subjective (517-526). In *Meaning and Moral Order*, Wuthnow (1987) advocated for abandoning the problem of meaning altogether in cultural analysis.

According to Kaufman (2004)'s review, recent sociological developments in internalist explanations of culture have taken a post-hermeneutic orientation and departed away from the interpretation of meaning. One notable attempt is the semiotic approach led by Alexander and Smith (2001). As strong proponents of "cultural autonomy," Alexander and Smith are only against "thin" or "weak" hermeneutic analysis that reads a text at its face value. Following Geertz (1973), they proposed to read social texts as coded symbols rather than reified abstract values. Unlike Geertz, who refuses any kind of generalization, Alexander and Smith propose to follow the structural linguistic tradition of Saussure (2011) and Lévi-Strauss (1983) to study culture as a system of "arbitrary" signs, which are not necessarily derived from any social referent, or the signified, but only from their own relationships with

each other. They argue that structural analysis has great analytic power to yield generalizable causal claims. For instance, Alexander and Smith (1993) find that there are a basic set of “democrat codes” in American political discourses, and this set of symbols get reproduced over and over again in contingent political contexts over the centuries. In another study, Alexander (2002) delineated how the word “Holocaust” detached from its initial usage and became a free-floating signifier in American culture. His structuralist explanation is that the word only achieves its prominence by becoming an anchor in a symbolic system so that it can be used for making symbolic analogies with other words. Alexander (2002) agree with Kane (1991) that the analytic autonomy of culture is only situated in concrete historical contexts. However, because culture forms an analytically distinct social domain, they argue that the causal autonomy of culture can be studied separately from the comprehensive problem of how culture interacts with other social structures (196). They nevertheless admit that their qualitative approach does not allow for rigorous counterfactual falsification (167).

Another approach that has achieved a relative degree of causal success is the ecological analysis led by Lieberman (2000). Lieberman sees cultural symbols are in competition with each other. When one symbol is overused, novelty-seeking consumers would start to look for alternatives. In his empirical analysis of American baby names, He found that the naming practices followed certain internal fashion cycles. Because new tastes were only built on existing old tastes, changes only took place in incremental fashions. The trends can be predicted in empirical observations. However, this embryonic form of ecological analysis does not account for any web of meaning cultural symbols are embedded in.

In general, internalist explanations of culture hypothesize a relative degree of autonomy in cultural production. Despite the fact that culture is constantly influenced by external social factors, an internalist account only needs to demonstrate that there are some internal causal mechanisms in the production of cultural symbols. Furthermore, a causal claim can only be rigorously made if its hypothesis is falsifiable, and its outcomes are predictable. Following Alexander and Smith and Lieberman, our empirical framework employs both 1) a

structuralist way of analyzing ideas as symbols (words) and 2) a falsifiable ecological analysis. And we aim to answer one simple yet fundamental question: what internal structure of an ideological system constrains and enables certain ideas to thrive or perish? In the next section, we will put a special emphasis on the concept of the field and explain how it can be a useful analytic device for studying our problem.

Discovering Self-Organization in Fields

In sociology, the concept of “field” has its most famous application in Pierre Bourdieu’s analysis of cultural production. Bourdieu (1993) sees cultural fields as arenas of competition for social actors to reproduce their social distinction. Every actor has a position in the arena relative to others, and the field is the topological space in which the positions are in. The field has an effect in the sense that every position induces a disposition (habitus) that gives the person who occupies it a sense of the world he is in. Although Bourdieu is always more interested in the production of culture rather than internal structures of culture, his conceptualization of “field” nevertheless provides a powerful analytical tool for making endogenous explanations of social phenomena as he argues that fields are objective realities and induce rules of their own (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 94–114). The concept has also been widely used in the studies of organizations.

John Levi Martin (2003) proposes that field theory could have a wide range of applications in social sciences. As the concept was first rigorously applied in the studies of classical physics, it is useful for explaining phenomena in which elements 1) are not in direct contact with each other and 2) experience forces induced by their positions. A field or field effect exists insofar as it offers a parsimonious explanation of the movements in it. Just like in the case of an electromagnetic field or gravitational field, a field is not a separate entity by itself and is only construed by the things in it. But it can nevertheless be self-organizing, and its self-organization can be demonstrated from the patterned effects observed in it. Field

can be a useful analytical device for studying meso-level phenomena when the micro-level actions cannot be exactly specified. The lack of micro-level links is not necessarily a defect as it allows researchers to analyze problems from a holistic perspective. Martin argues that, in sociology, a field approach can be especially fruitful when it is applied to some existing line of research, such as the “inner laws” of social spheres specified by Weber. For all these reasons, field theory is a powerful analytic tool for studying endogenous social phenomena.

Just like in organizational studies, the unit of analysis in a social field does not have to be individuals but can be any meso-level social constructs. In sociology, field as a concept has already been deployed in internalist explanations of culture (Kaufman 2004). For instance, in Lieberman (2000)’s ecological analysis, the fashion cycles of baby names can be thought of as a one-dimensional field phenomenon. In *Chaos of Discipline*, Abbott (2001) argues that there is a “fractal process” in the internal division of academic disciplines. The fractal process can be thought of as a field process in a discrete space. Wuthnow (1989) deploys the concept of “discursive field” in his explanation of the Protestant Reformation. In the social movement literature, “discursive fields” have also been used for a better understanding of the framing processes of social movement discourses (Snow 2004). Ideas and cultural symbols are meso-level social constructs that do not directly interact with each other. Their usages are always mediated by people. Nevertheless, they exist always in relationship with each other and form an analytically distinct domain. They also occupy ecological “positions” relative to each other. Their usages can be affected by their internal “field” positions.

Despite its usefulness, the concept of “field” has mostly been used metaphorically, and its operationalization remains elusive. In this essay, we treat words as signs in a symbolic system and propose a research design to study the movement of words in their contextual field. One less clarified problem in the literature of field analysis is that fields are oftentimes operationalized as static constructs although field theory is intrinsically dynamic. Structure and change are paired concepts. Social systems are never in homeostasis. To study structure is to study how change is enabled and disabled. And the empirical question we want to focus

on is: where do changes survive in a contextual field?

Another unclear problem in the literature of field studies is how boundaries should be defined (Martin 2003, 24). We take it to be less of an issue. The existence of a field only manifests in its effects. We do not assume that a field constitutes a separate reality. In this study, nor do we need to make a Parsonian a priori assumption about the analytic autonomy of culture. We only argue that if cultural autonomy is present, it should be observable in field effects.

We put a heavier emphasis on the survival rather than the introduction of changes. We do not hold that ideology is a closed system. As ideology is always influenced by non-ideological forces, changes are constantly infused from the outside. The introduction of change is a non-issue. Cultural evolution happens in the long run, and what matters is what survives. Social fields thus differ from physical fields in one crucial respect: social fields are ecological. In the social world, fields are arenas of contestation in which elements struggle for survival. In the short run, changes could come from random disturbances and external shocks. However, in the long run, if a field position induces an effect, the effect should manifest in the survival of the elements that occupies the position.

In particular, we propose that a new word has a better chance to survive if it can be incorporated into a coherent rhetoric field. Social phenomena are organic and living. Living organisms reverse the law of entropy and create orders and structures in the world. In the production of social texts, self-organization could emerge as a consequence of rationalization or structural differentiation of signs. Rationalization is a process in which ideas become internally coherent with each other (Weber 1958). Coherent ideas are more powerful as they are more persuasive and universal. There is no reason to assume that people always think rationally and coherently. But as ideas compete with each other, there is good reason to believe that, coherent ideas should hold competitive advantages and have better chances to survive (Swidler 1986). Meanwhile, ideas are also expressed as symbols. In a symbolic system, signs only become symbols as they are used in structural differentiation with each

other. A sign (word) wouldn't have any symbolic value if it is randomly used in combination with others. To achieve clarity, signs also need to be coherently used. In field terminology, the coherence of a rhetorical field can be represented by the stability of the relationships of the elements in it, i.e., the stability of the field. To test whether cultural autonomy is present, we hypothesize that in ideological change,

Hypothesis 1 *New words are more likely to survive in stable fields.*

In the next section, we will introduce our research design and explain how we operationalize the construction of a field and the test of its effect.

Research Design

Data source

The discourses we studied are more than 50 years of full-text articles published in the *People's Daily*. The *People's Daily* is the ideal source for studying the CCP's ideology. It is the official organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and publishes the most authoritative statements regarding the Party's political and economic policies. Even top Party leaders (including Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping) have occasionally participated in writing and editing articles (Wu 1994). Rather than acting as a media "watch dog," it is a de-facto "propaganda machine" (Brady 2009). Having first been published in May 1946 and having a current circulation of 3 million, the *People's Daily* is one of China's most influential media outlets, and UNESCO lists it among the world's top-10 news media. Its influence often extends to other media and organizations in China. For instance, the paper's commentaries often become the main material for nationwide weekly "political studies," and other media outlets, including radio, television and newspapers, often have to re-broadcast or reprint important commentaries that appear in the *People's Daily* (Wu 1994). In Mao's era, editorials and leading articles can also play a major role in launching new political

campaigns (Brady 2009).

All of its issues can be accessed directly on its official website. Our data came from the database of *wengewang*, a third-party website that purchased the full-text from the very first issue published in 1946 to the last issue of 2003. We checked the completeness of the database by matching all the article titles in it with those on the official website. The overlap rate was at least 99.4%. The entire corpus contained a total of 1,342,414 news articles and commentaries, encompassing 260 million semantic words and a set of 1,214,510 unique vocabularies.

Exploratory method

A direct way to detect signals in comparisons of texts is to count word frequencies. In computational content analysis, the analysis of word frequencies has been widely applied to domain-specific keywords to track substantive changes and differences in texts (Gentzkow and Shapiro 2010; Klingenstein, Hitchcock, and DeDeo 2014). It can also be applied to meaning-free functional words to track changes and differences in linguistic and literary styles (Danescu-Niculescu-Mizil et al. 2012; Hughes et al. 2012). In this study, we were more interested in changes in substantive content rather than linguistic styles; thus, only non-functional words were used in our analyses (See Supplementary Section 1). After the frequencies of all the words of interest were counted, a probability distribution of the words was derived as a bag-of-words representation of the corpus. Temporal changes were our primary focus. The probability distribution of words between two time periods was compared by calculating the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence. Furthermore, we employed correspondence analysis (CA) (See Supplementary Section 2) to term frequency-inverse document frequency (tf-idf) matrices (See Supplementary Section 2) constructed from the word frequency distributions. CA is a dimension-reduction technique that is commonly applied to count data. It allowed us to capture the most significant trends in changes in word frequency.

Construction of field

Field analysis presupposes the existence of a social space (Martin 2003). To capture nuanced semantic relationships that were ignored in our bag-of-words models, we employed a neural probabilistic model to embed words into high-dimensional vector spaces. In neural probabilistic language models, words are learned as vectors in a hidden layer of neurons to predict words that appear around them in a corpus (Bengio et al. 2003). This class of method has achieved tremendous success in natural language processing. In this study, we used the word2vec model invented by Mikolov et al. to train our word embedding. Word2vec is a very fast and efficient algorithm for learning high-quality word representations (Mikolov, Sutskever, et al. 2013; Mikolov, Chen, et al. 2013), and it has become a state-of-the-art technique in computational content analysis (Caliskan, Bryson, and Narayanan 2017; Garg et al. 2018; Kozlowski, Taddy, and Evans 2019). In general, the model is based on the distributional hypothesis in linguistics, which asserts that words appearing in similar contexts hold similar meaning (Harris 1954; Firth 1957; Mikolov, Sutskever, et al. 2013). It resonates well with structuralist theories in structural linguistics and cultural anthropology (Saussure 2011; Lévi-Strauss 1983; Kozlowski, Taddy, and Evans 2019). Its success suggests that a machine is able to produce natural languages by just learning how words are used with other words.

This structuralist way of thinking is also fundamental in semantic network analysis (Rule, Cointet, and Bearman 2015). However, networks rest on discrete spaces, and the dimensionality of a semantic network grows linearly with vocabulary size, which can make it very difficult to analyze. Word embedding provides an optimal way for learning semantic geometries in a moderate number of dimensions with a low informational loss. It also allows one to perform algebraic operations on its learned vector space to reveal semantic compositionality and analogy (Mikolov, Sutskever, et al. 2013; Kozlowski, Taddy, and Evans 2019). The Supplementary Section 3, contains some well-illustrated examples of vector algebra generated from our models. Vector fields can thus be easily modeled on top of word-embedding spaces

Another benefit of word-embedding spaces is that they provided a way for us to select domain-specific keywords. More specifically, we used the nearest neighbors of the words “economy” and “politics”, respectively, as economic keywords and political keywords. These domain-specific words allowed us to focus on specific substantive areas in our exploratory analyses.

Word embedding spaces only preserve the similarity between words and are, therefore, coordinate-free. Nevertheless, vector spaces in different time periods can be aligned to track rhetorical changes over time (Kulkarni et al. 2014; Hamilton, Leskovec, and Jurafsky 2016b). We used Procrustes Analyses to align the vector spaces of all the years to one coordinate system to permit comparisons. This allowed us to find the (in)stability of a word w from year $t - 1$ to t as the cosine dissimilarity between the vector representations of the word in $t - 1$ and t . Moreover, because words that are close to each other in a vector space are words that share similar contexts, the method allowed us to measure not only the instability of every word, but also the instability of the contextual field the word was in.

To calculate the field instability of any position in the vector space, we took its k -nearest neighboring words in the vector space in year t . Then, we computed the instabilities of the neighboring words from $t - 1$ to t and took their average as the instability of the field. Alternatively, field instability can also be measured as the substitution rate of a position’s number of new neighbors over its number of old neighbors in year t in comparison with $t - 1$ (Palla, Barabási, and Vicsek 2007). A field is stable if its neighbors are relatively the same over years. This alternative measure does not rely on Procrustes Analysis and can be used to check the robustness of our analyses.

Figure 1 gives an example of a stable field and an unstable field under each measure. Stable fields are neighborhoods where there are less movements and less new neighbors. Conversely, unstable fields are neighborhoods with more movements and more new neighbors. Our measures should make an intuitive sense.




Figure 1: 2D examples of stable and unstable fields under two measures of field stability

Exploratory Findings

Path Dependency with Critical Junctures

Path dependency has been found to be a central feature in cultural evolution (Hughes et al. 2012). Novel rhetoric cannot be created out of nowhere and depends heavily on time trends and what is available from the past. We found persistent path dependency in the CCP’s state ideology, especially in the economic domain. Heatmaps, based on year-to-year KL divergences, are shown in Figure 2. The analysis was applied to all words as well as domain-specific words. Three major phases of the People’s Republic of China can be clearly identified in all three heatmaps. The three phases are the socialist construction period from 1949 to 1966, the Cultural Revolution period from 1967 to 1976, and the economic reform period from 1977 to the last year included in our analysis. It can be seen that the year-to-year KL divergences in the last period were especially small in comparison with the earlier two periods. Although this period was the time when the great economic transformation took place, it was a very self-consistent period in terms of party ideology.




Figure 2: Heatmaps based on year-to-year KL divergences

Time series, which were constructed with two choices of prior distribution, are plotted in Figure 3. The time series on the top of the figure were constructed with the prior distribution equal to the probability distribution of words in the final year (i.e., 2003). The time series at the bottom were constructed with the prior distribution equal to the probability distribution of words over the 12 months preceding month t . As shown in the graphs, after the Cultural Revolution, the CCP’s official state rhetoric had, in general, moved in a very smooth and

linear fashion across almost the entire time. This time series had a much shorter memory during the reform period than the previous period. After an external shock, it appeared to quickly revert back to its mean. For instance, in Figure 3, an obvious external shock can be detected at $t = 1989M06$, which precisely corresponds to the crackdown on the Tiananmen Student Movement. The word frequencies in that month differ radically from the frequency distributions in the preceding months. However unlike political events during the Cultural Revolution, the Tiananmen event had very little long-term impact on the CCP's overall state discourse. In the economic domain, the shock was hardly detectable. Quickly after the crackdown, the CCP's official state rhetoric proceeded as if Tiananmen never happened.

In contrast to the overall stability, patterns in the economic domain were somewhat different. There was no obvious shock during the entire reform period in terms of monthly divergence. However, in terms of convergence toward the present, it can be clearly seen that the period can be further divided into two sub-regimes. The critical time point is the beginning of 1992 and corresponds to another critical event in the history of the CCP, a southern tour made by Deng Xiaoping, the chief architect of China's reforms.

Time dependencies can also be clearly captured by CA. Two CA biplots are shown in Figure 4. One was applied to all economic words at all time points, and the other was applied only to economic words in the period from 1982 to 2003. CA is completely unsupervised. Two words or two months would appear close to each other only if their respective columns or rows were similarly loaded. Arrows were drawn to connect the centroids of adjacent years. In the first plot, time dependencies could be traced with two dimensions. In the second plot, only the first dimension was needed to align all the years in a linear order. Unlike in previous years, the CCP's economic discourse never went backwards in the last two decades covered by our analysis.

However, with the help of the second dimension, a change in discourse could again be detected. In the spring of 1992, Deng Xiaoping, who was officially retired but still the most powerful political figure, made a series of public visits to several special economic zones in






Figure 3: Monthly frequency change measured in KL divergence

Economic words, 1946-2003



Economic words, 1982-2003




Figure 4: CA biplots in row principal components, dim 1 vs. dim 2. In the graph on the left, the first principal dimension captures an ideological shift from the leftist point during the Cultural Revolution toward the latest time point in the reform period. The second dimension captures how the Party's state economic ideology became radicalized during the Cultural Revolution and then reverted back to its 1950s level before embarking on its journey toward reform and opening-up. A biplot of economic words from 1982 to 2003 is shown in the right graph.

South China and strongly signaled his dissatisfaction with the progress of China’s reforms. Authorities in Beijing eventually responded positively in the *People’s Daily*. The event marked the beginning of China’s market reforms (Vogel 2011). Although the change in tone was pushed from the outside, our result suggests that it was not so much an external shock as it was a trigger of change in internal patterns. More about this will be explained in the next section.

New Wine in Old Bottles

Next, we found that the entire transformation was initiated in the late 1970s by initially utilizing some existing 1950s repertoires. The CA biplot shows that the CCP’s official state ideology after extreme radicalization during the Cultural Revolution, first, shifted gradually back to the level of 1950s (in a recovering period) in both the first and second dimensions, before evolving to its current form.

We also measured yearly changes in discourse in the word-embedding spaces. First, we selected the words most similar to “economy” and “politics” in the last year. Then, we extrapolated the probability of their co-occurrence in all previous years. The results, which are shown in Figure 5, were similar to what we found in the word-frequency analysis. In both the economic and political domains, there was a “recovering” process. Some scholars argue that the Cultural Revolution destroyed China’s state bureaucratic machine and unintentionally paved the way for later institutional reforms (Shirk 1993; Naughton 1995). In contrast, our results suggest that, rhetorically, the Party first changed its discourse back to its earlier base and proceeded from there. The results are consistent with some earlier interpretive studies of the CCP’s ideological change (Tsou 1983; Sun 1995).

During unsettled periods when great social transformations are ongoing, different ideologies emerge in competition with each other and articulate in more consistent fashions. Whether one ideology thrives depends on whether it serves a structural need well. We found that when a sudden change happened, newly introduced concepts still needed to be attached




Figure 5: Log-likelihoods of co-occurrences of the most recent year’s political and economic words given each year’s corpus.

to existing stable repertoires to become stabilized. Figure 6 is a visualization of the contextual field around “market economy” in 1992. The blue arrows represent the movement of the phrase in the contextual space. The movement suggests that since its inception in 1984, the phrase was used in different contexts until 1992. After 1992, its contextual usage stabilized, and the phrase finally settled down in one location. The figure also suggests that when the phrase was first introduced, it was used in unstable fields (as shown along the z-axis) and surrounded by words that were fairly sensitive words, such as “monopoly”, “multi-party system”, and “financial crisis”. The phrase became stabilized in 1992, by being contextually attached to a highly stable subspace of words, surrounded by safe words like “reform” and “socialism”. Figure 7 corroborates the fact that its new contextual neighbors were already very stable prior to the year of stabilization, compared to its old neighbors.

Confirmatory Analysis

The settlement of “market economy” in 1992 is consistent with our hypothesis. The concept only thrived in the rhetorical field after it was incorporated into a stable field. But can this finding be generalized? Does the survival of any new word, in general, depend on the stability of its contextual field?

We examined the causal effect of field instability on word survival by employing dynamic Poisson mixed-effects models. Estimates with three different covariate specifications are reported in Table 1. Model (1) was a baseline model with only temporal dependence and fixed and random effects. Our focal variable, field instability, was included in Model (2). k -nearest neighbors, with $k = 50$, were used in the measurement of field instability. Model estimates with $k = 30$ and/or a different measure of field instability are reported in Supplementary Section 5. Self-instability was also controlled because it could be associated with field instability, and previous studies have found that frequency and self-instability are highly correlated (Hamilton, Leskovec, and Jurafsky 2016b, 2016a). The table shows that Model (2) fits the data much better than the baseline model, and that field instability exerted a strong and direct negative effect on word frequency. In other words, the more unstable a word’s field was, the less likely it was to survive. A permutation-based significance test is reported in Supplementary Section 5. Because the causal direction between self-instability and self-frequency is unclear, to avoid collider bias, only lagged self-instability was controlled in Model (3), and its effect was found to be minimal; thus, we could exclude self-instability as a confounder.

To investigate further whether the field effect was truly exogenous⁹, we focused on the initial conditions of all the words during the first 12 months since their inception, and regressed every month’s frequency on field instability, controlling for birth cohort in a Poisson regression. Coefficient estimates are plotted in Figure 8. The results showed that the effect was positive in the 1st month and only became negative after the 2nd month. In other words, the words that were born in unstable fields had higher initial frequencies than those born in stable fields. The field stabilizing effect only came later after birth. Year-by-year results are shown in Supplementary Section 6. The pattern was consistent across all years.

Similarly, when the question of where new words were born was asked, field instability

9. Here, we use the word “exogeneous” to mean that the treatment variable is not correlated with the error terms. Within our theoretical framework, the field effect offers an internalist (endogenous) explanation of rhetorical change

was found to be positively related to birth. Logistic regression results are reported in the last column of Table 1 to show whether a word was more likely to be a new word or old word given its field instability. In contrast to survival, birth was more likely to occur in unstable fields rather than stable fields.

In sum, the logic behind birth and survival were entirely different. New words were more likely to be born in unstable fields, and words that were born in unstable fields also had higher initial frequencies. However, only words that were later situated in stable fields were likely to survive.

Conclusion

As the CCP's mouthpiece, the *People's Daily* certainly reflects the Party leaders' will and is definitely influenced by outside forces on a daily basis. However, our analyses suggest that external shocks and the whims of power only add rhetorical ingredients. Long-term discourse cannot be easily changed at will. Self-consistency is always a fundamental principle that glues an ideological system together. As already noted by many China experts, the Chinese reform was not a pre-planned project, but always proceeded in a "snowballing" fashion (Shirk 1993). The CCP is known to be good at using old repertoires to promote new ideas (Perry 1980). Our analyses demonstrate again that path dependency is a central feature in cultural evolution.

What is striking about our results is that time-dependent patterns in the *People's Daily* were driven by a few time-independent rules. Although fundamental changes in the economic mode of production had happened in CCP China, discourse changes in the Party's mouthpiece had proceeded in a highly consistent fashion. External shocks as large as the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown could quickly die out in such a system and had little long-term effects on discourse change. In order to have long-term consequences, new elements must be internally incorporated into existing contexts. Controversial new concepts like "market

economy” only became stabilized in such a system by being contextually attached to a safe harbor.

Our results also suggest that the birth and survival of novelty involve two different processes. Birth mostly comes out of the instability of a system, but a new element can also quickly die in an unstable field. In order to have a long-term impact, it is better to be integrated into a stable part of the system. The results are consistent with Padgett and Powell (2012)’s recent theory of invention. Similar rules have been previously found in knowledge production (Uzzi et al. 2013).

In a rhetorical system, words are not isolated “atoms”, but are embedded in contexts. The fate of every word – its survival, prospering, and death – depends on the context in which it is used. When a word is interlocked with other words in a stable context, a positive feedback loop can be activated to generate more re-occurrences of it (Padgett and Powell 2012). In the long run, changes that can reproduce survive. In this sense, an ideological system has an autonomous rule of its own.

Discussion

Could it be the case the internalist patterns that were found in this study were only epiphenomenal? In other words, could they merely be shadows of some material activities rather than having autonomy of their own? Our field explanation is a meso-level explanation. The micro-level actions that determined the movement of the words were not observed.

We, however, do not naively assume that words can move by themselves. Words, of course, are always moved by people, and their meanings oftentimes are arbitrarily decided by people. A full explanation of their movements would require an understanding of the actions behind their usages. However, words also only become meaningful when they are organized in some symbolic structures, and the symbolic structures could exist independent of their authors’ material interests.

Because our field analysis provides a parsimonious explanation of the movements of words, in light of Occam's razor, we argue that the patterns we observed were not epiphenomenal. If the patterns were merely reflective of some external phenomena, it would be very challenging to offer an externalist explanation that is as parsimonious in explaining the complex economic and political reality that the texts represent. For instance, in the case of "market economy," the phrase was first used in the newspaper for seven years without a stable contextual usage. It acted like a free-floating signifier without any clear external referent. After it settled down in 1992, it became an anchor in the field. A closer look at its final neighborhood would reveal that its neighboring words are anchor words like "reform," "socialism," and "economic development" as well. Rather than having any clear external referents, those words acted more like "coded symbols" that only make other words in the surrounding space meaningful. Although there was certainly an external force in 1992 that triggered the settlement of "market economy," the explanation that our field analysis offered is still internalist in the sense that the external push only had an effect insofar as it was internalized in the rhetorical field. Without the parsimonious explanation we offered, it would be very challenging to link the bizarre movement of the phrase to external events in the material world.

Marx was famous for inverting the Hegelian dialectics. In this study, we attempted a second inversion and applied a Hegelian analysis to a Marxist discourse. However, our attempt is very modest. We do not seek to provide a comprehensive causal understanding of the role of ideology in the development of history. Our goal is only to demonstrate, with causal precision, that there is some internal autonomy in the development of ideas. We do not deny that ideology is constantly influenced by material interests and external forces. But using Bourdieu's "game" metaphor, we would like to argue that even if ideology is just a game, it is nevertheless a game to be played, and in its playing, the game acquires a life of its own.

Our findings are also related to the classical question of "where novelty comes from." In studies of knowledge production, it is a well-known wisdom that successful inventions are

made out of atypical combinations of old elements. Actors, organizations, and ideas that occupy “structural-hole” positions enjoy relative competitive advantage over their peers (Burt 1992). Many existing studies were performed on cross-sectional data. In cross-sectional data, failed cases do not get observed. Many cross-sectional analysis might suffer from survival bias. Our findings are partly consistent with conventional wisdom insofar as we found that novel words emerged in unstable contexts. However, our findings also suggest that the problem of survival might have been overlooked in previous studies. Future studies are needed to clarify the distinction between the two processes.

Our findings are generally consistent with either a Weberian explanation or a Durkheimian explanation. Field stabilization could arise out of rationalization or some symbolic structures. Our empirical analysis does not provide a way to test which one is true. Future work will be needed to answer our question with more precision.

Traditionally, the meaning of texts can only be qualitatively interpreted by social science experts in *verstehen* modes, the method of which is limited by both the volume of texts that an expert can read and the reader’s subjective biases. With the help of machine learning, the methods employed in our research provide new quantitative ways for extracting the most salient internal patterns from massive textual data, which can be applied to many other areas of research in the age of information overload.

Methodological Appendix

The probability distribution of words between two time periods was compared by calculating the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence, defined as:

$$D_{\text{KL}}(P||Q) = \sum_i P(w_i) \log \frac{P(w_i)}{Q(w_i)} \quad (1)$$

where P and Q are probability distributions of words in two different time periods, and $P(w_i)$ and $Q(w_i)$ are the probabilities of word i under P and Q , respectively. The KL divergence

is a precise measure of the extra bits of information that are needed when Q is used to approximate P (Kullback and Leibler 1951). A time series \mathbf{d} can then be constructed with:

$$d_t = D_{\text{KL}}(P_t||Q_t), \quad (2)$$

where P_t is the probability distribution of words in the t th time period and Q_t is a prior reference distribution. The method allowed us to quantify the speed of change through time.

We embedded the words from every year into a 400-dimensional vector space. Specifically, we used the skip-gram model. Given a sequence of training words w_1, \dots, w_N , the objective of the skip-gram model is to find a two-layer representation of words to maximize the average log probability,

$$\frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=-k}^k \log p(w_{i+j}|w_i) \quad (3)$$

where k is a window size. The probability of correctly predicting the word w_i given the word w_j is defined as

$$p(w_i|w_j) = \frac{\exp(\mathbf{u}_{w_i}^\top \mathbf{v}_{w_j})}{\sum_{l=1}^{\mathcal{V}} \exp(\mathbf{u}_{w_l}^\top \mathbf{v}_{w_j})}, \quad (4)$$

where $v_{w_j}, u_{w_i} \in \mathbb{R}^d$ are the input and output vector representations of the word w_j and w_i , and \mathcal{V} is the set of all unique vocabularies in the corpus (Mikolov, Sutskever, et al. 2013). Huffman Trees were used to speed up computation, and optimal solutions were found through stochastic gradient descent. Equations [3] and [4] made it possible to extrapolate the probability of the co-occurrence of a set of words given a year’s learned vector space by utilizing both the input and output representations of the words (Taddy 2015).

Given two word embeddings, the Procrustes Analysis finds the best orthogonal linear transformation (reflection and/or rotation) of one with respect to the other (See Supplementary Section 4). It allowed us finding the (in)stability of a word w from year $t - 1$ to t as $\cos \theta_{w,t}$. An alternative measure is the substitution rate of a word’s k -nearest neighbors (Palla, Barabási, and Vicsek 2007) (See Supplementary Section 5). We used both methods.

These methods allowed us to measure the instability of the contextual field the word was in, as $\frac{1}{k} \sum_{j=1}^k \cos \theta_{w_j,t}$ where w_j 's are w 's k -nearest neighbors.

To study the causal effect of field instability on word survival, we considered the following dynamic Poisson mixed-effects model:

$$\begin{aligned} \log(\lambda_{i,t}) &= \alpha + \gamma \log F_{i,t-1} + \mathbf{x}_{i,t}^\top \boldsymbol{\beta} + \mu_i + \nu_t \\ F_{i,t} &\sim \text{Poisson}(\lambda_{i,t}), \end{aligned} \tag{5}$$

where $F_{i,t}$ is the frequency of word i in year t , $\mathbf{x}_{i,t}$ are covariates of interest, and μ_i and ν_t are the random effects of word i and year t . A lagged log frequency term was included to account for temporal dependence, and the yearly frequencies of every new word since the first year after its inception were included in our analysis. (The definition of new word is explained in Supplementary Section 5.) To model initial conditions, we assumed that the first month's frequency of every word was truly exogenous and used that as $F_{i,t-1}$ when $t-1$ is the year of inception. For that reason, an "initial year \times lagged log frequency" interaction term was also included to account for a different γ . The fixed effect of age (t - birth year) was included as a covariate. This Poisson model is equivalent to an event history model, assuming piece-wise constant hazard rates in which the outcome variable is the re-occurrences of words.

Availability of Data and Code

All necessary data and codes for replicating the findings of this study are publicly available at <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1gkihvxJ24mhB6qasU635HdprfqezFSXO/view?usp=sharing>.

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


Figure 7: The yearly cohorts of the 100-nearest neighbors of “market economy” were first obtained from the word-embedding models, and their yearly average instabilities were plotted over time. It can be seen that the post-1992 neighbors were already more stable than pre-1992 neighbors before the year of stabilization. In other words, the phrase were settled in an existing stable neighborhood.




Figure 8: Effect of field instability on frequency in the first 12 months since inception

Table 1: Mixed effect Poisson regression (1-3) and logistic regression

| Outcome | Frequency | | | Birth |
|--|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | |
| Lagged log frequency | 0.382*** (0.004) | 0.085*** (0.005) | 0.409*** (0.007) | |
| Self-instability | | -3.340*** (0.006) | | |
| Lagged self-instability | | | 0.268*** (0.006) | |
| Field instability | | -5.600*** (0.011) | -6.100*** (0.012) | 6.522*** (0.092) |
| Initial year × Lagged log frequency | -0.067*** (0.010) | 0.062*** (0.009) | | |
| Constant | 2.065*** (0.035) | 9.200*** (0.040) | 6.154*** (0.030) | 11.149 (25.780) |
| Age fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
| Year fixed effects | | | | Yes |
| Variance of random effects | | | | |
| Word | 0.279 | 0.312 | 0.191 | |
| Year | 0.035 | 0.045 | 0.026 | |
| Observations | 149,775 | 149,775 | 110,613 | 260,153 |
| Log-likelihood | -2,123,668 | -1,680,292 | -1,278,355 | -123,478 |
| Log-likelihood ratio test | | 886,753*** | | |
| Bayesian Inf. Crit. | 4,247,802 | 3,361,073 | 2,557,163 | 247,417 |

Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.